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Abstract	
Despite	significant	grid	expansion	during	the	last	decade,	globally	India	has	the	highest	number	of	people	
lacking	access	to	electricity.	Mini-grid	has	been	suggested	as	a	possible	electrification	option	and	the	new	
mini-grid	policy	of	the	state	of	Uttar	Pradesh	has	attracted	global	attention.	Relatedly,	the	drive	for	grid	
extension	restricts	off-grid	areas	to	very	remote	locations	and	enhances	the	risks	for	mini-grid	projects.	
Simultaneously,	the	pledge	for	increasing	renewable	energy	share	in	the	power	supply	mix	opens	the	
possibility	of	large-scale	embedded	renewable	energy	generation	in	the	rural	areas.	This	paper	investigates	
the	viability	of	solar	PV-based	mini-grids	using	a	discounted	cash	flow	analysis	and	considers	the	UP-policy	
prescriptions	to	explore	the	case	of	a	megawatt	(MW)-scale	grid-connected	solar	PV	under	a	power	
purchase	agreement.	It	identifies	the	viability	support	requirements	for	both	cases	under	different	business	
conditions.	It	finds	that	mini-grids	are	not	a	viable	proposition	if	the	tariff	prescribed	in	UP	is	used	and	that	
other	cost	minimising	support	(such	as	capital	subsidy	or	low	interest	debt	or	an	output-based	subsidy)	
would	be	required	to	attract	private	investments.	Large-scale	solar	projects,	on	the	other	hand,	are	more	
viable	and	can	be	an	attractive	proposition	for	rural	electrification	in	the	Indian	context.		
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1.0	Introduction	
 
Out	of	1.1	billion	people	lacking	access	to	electricity	in	2016,	India	accounted	for	22.5%	(or	239	million)	
(IEA,	2017).		Electricity	access	situation	in	India	is	fast	changing	as	India	has	stepped-up	its	efforts	towards	
universal	electrification	through	targeted	access	measures	with	the	aim	of	providing	universal	electricity	
access	by	2019	(Sustainable	Energy	for	All,	2017).		In	fact,	India	has	made	significant	progress	in	
electrification	over	the	past	five	years	when	millions	of	households	got	connected	to	the	grid	under	the	
National	Rural	Electrification	Programmes.		India	has	extended	the	electricity	grid	to	around	99.8%	of	the	
villages1	but	around	51	million	households	are	still	lacking	access	to	electricity2.	Forty	six	million	rural	
households	and	five	million	urban	households	are	estimated	to	lack	access	to	electricity.	The	recently	
launched	programme	‘Saubhagya	Yojana’	(or	Pradhan	Mantri	Sahaj	Bijli	Har	Ghar	Yojana)	aims	to	provide	
access	to	all	by	2019	although	the	target	looks	quite	optimistic.		
With	the	recent	drive	for	grid	extension,	off-grid	solutions	are	being	pushed	to	remote	areas	in	India.			
These	solutions	come	in	two	generic	forms	–	stand-alone	systems	and	local-grid	systems,	although	hybrid	
options	such	as	networking	of	stand-alone	systems	are	also	emerging,	but	stand-alone	systems	tend	to	be	a	
costlier	option	and	Chattopadhyay	et	al.	(2015)	indicate	that	a	transition	from	solar	home	systems	to	mini-
grids	will	generate	more	power	and	reduce	costs.	However,	off-grid	projects	tend	to	be	less	attractive	to	
private	investors	(Schmidt	et	al.,	2013)	due	to	small	investment	volume,	high	risk	and	low	return3.	
Renewable	energy-based	projects	face	undue	competition	from	fossil	fuel	subsidies	and	investors	face	
																																								 																				
1 http://www.ddugjy.gov.in/mis/portal/index.jsp as on 25th March 2018. 
2 As per Government of India estimates for the launch of Suabhagya – Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojona 
(https://powermin.nic.in/sites/default/files/webform/notices/OM_SAUBHAGYA_SIGNED_COPY.pdf).   
 
3	Investment	required	for	mini-grid	projects	falls	below	the	investment	threshold	of	private	corporate	
investors.	High transaction cost and effort on a unit basis makes small investment unattractive. 
Financial institution do not fund because they have to spent same or more time and effort to fund 
small mini grid project vis-a-vis finding utility scale solar projects. Bundling can address the issue, 
but understanding about the functioning of mini-grids is also an issue. Also banks are more 
comfortable funding projects, which have PPAs rather than projects which are entirety dependent 
on retail tariff with uncertain collection efficiency. This also calls for larger plants with part 
generation tied via PPA to better project bankability & thus viability.  
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significant	macro-economic,	regulatory	and	political	risks	while	making	investment	decisions	in	a	
developing	country	like	India.	The	risk	for	mini-grid	investment	increases	as	the	grid	extension	process	
intensifies	and	high	risks	make	return	expectations	prohibitively	high,	making	investments	unviable	
(Bhattacharyya,	2013).	While	the	connection	problem	is	being	resolved	to	a	large	extent	through	grid	
extension,	the	availability	and	reliability	of	electricity	continues	to	be	problematic	and	mere	connection	in	
rural	areas	does	not	necessarily	mean	reliable	supply.	In	this	context,	a	large	number	of	private	sector	
based	mini-grids	has	been	set	up	and	in	many	areas	consumers	appreciate	their	reliability	vis-à-vis	the	grid	
(Graber	et	al.,	2018).			
In	the	Indian	context,	thus	two	opposing	forces	are	clearly	visible:		
1) Various	states	with	electricity	access	deficits	(such	as	Uttar	Pradesh,	Bihar	and	Jharkand)	have	come	
up	with	policies	for	attracting	mini-grid	investments	to	support	their	electricity	access	efforts.	It	is	
interesting	to	explore	whether	village-scale	mini-grids	are	viable	under	such	policy	terms	and	
conditions.	
2) The	government	aim	of	extending	the	grid	acts	as	a	major	concern	for	village-scale	mini-grids.	
Comello	et	al.	(2017)	have	identified	the	possibility	of	stranded	assets	in	mini-grids	due	to	grid	
expansion	and	consider	this	as	the	gateway	barrier	for	mini-grid	investment	in	India.		
If	grid	becomes	a	reality	in	a	rural	location,	the	government	objective	of	providing	reliable	electricity	round-
the-clock	may	be	difficult	to	realise	due	to	poor	distribution	sector	management.	In	addition,	financial	
constraints	to	support	infrastructure	development,	poor	governance	and	inconsistent	pricing	and	subsidy	
policies	also	hinder	reliable	electricity	supply	through	the	grid.	There	are	also	inherent	issues	of	operational	
inefficiencies	arising	from	old	infrastructure	that	results	in	extremely	high	transmission	and	distribution	
losses	(current	above	21%	in	India).	Renewable	energy	mini-grids	at	the	decentralised	level	could	avoid	
these	issues	but	under	the	threat	of	grid	extension,	the	mini-grid	business	remains	a	risky	investment	
proposition.		
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Whereas	grid	extension	increases	India’s	dependence	on	thermal	electricity,	the	renewable	energy-based	
mini-grids	would	contribute	to	India’s	climate	pledge	under	the	Paris	Agreement	to	increase	its	renewable	
electricity	share	to	40%	by	2030.	However,	if	grid	extension	leads	to	stranded	mini-grid	assets,	the	climate	
benefit	of	mini-grids	would	not	be	realised.	Instead,	integration	of	larger	renewable	energy-based	
electricity	generation	projects	in	rural	grids	along	the	lines	of	independent	power	producers	could	improve	
power	supply	condition	and	contribute	towards	emission	reduction	objectives	of	India,	while	taking	
advantage	of	scale	economies	of	power	generation.		
The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	analyse	how	a	stand-alone	mini-grid	investment	compares	with	a	grid-tied	
large-scale	renewable	power	generation	system	at	a	village	cluster	level	in	the	context	of	Uttar	Pradesh	
(UP)(India).	We	also	identify	enabling	conditions	and	support	systems	required	for	their	financial	viability.		
Although	Comello	et	al.	(2017)	has	investigated	the	mini-grid	investment	in	UP,	they	did	not	consider	the	
support	mechanisms	required	to	ensure	mini-grid	viability.	Further,	the	possibility	of	embedding	large-scale	
generators	at	the	rural	sub-transmission	or	distribution	grid	level	has	not	been	considered.	Ramchandran	et	
al.	(2016)	considered	alternative	business	service	models	and	support	strategies	but	they	did	not	consider	
recent	changes	in	the	mini-grid	policy	environment	in	India.	Bhattacharyya	and	Palit	(2016)	recommended	
steps	for	creating	an	enabling	mini-grid	environment	but	this	did	not	focus	on	the	possibility	of	rapid	grid	
extension.	We	bridge	this	gap	and	make	an	original	contribution	to	knowledge.	The	novelty	of	our	study	
arises	from	the	following:	1)	the	recent	policy	developments	in	mini-grids,	particularly	the	mini-grid	policy	
in	Uttar	Pradesh	(India),	have	been	captured;	2)	alternative	business	delivery	options	and	financial	support	
systems	are	considered	to	derive	policy	insights;	3)	the	feasibility	of	large-scale	grid-tied	solar	PV	generator	
in	a	rural	area	is	considered	to	compare	the	attractiveness	of	investment	opportunities.	While	the	paper	
focuses	on	India,	given	the	recent	emphasis	on	mini-grids	globally	for	enhancing	electricity	access,	the	
paper	has	relevance	for	Sub-Saharan	Africa	and	South	Asia	and	the	new	knowledge	can	assist	these	
countries	to	plan	their	electrification	efforts	properly.	India	has	never	considered	MW	level	PV	generator	in	
rural	areas	and	focussed	either	on	sub	100	kW	scale	micro	grids	or	large	utility	scale	solar	power	plants.	
Here	we	are	arguing	the	case	for	large-scale	solar	plants	(~2	MW)	at	the	village	cluster	level	for	rural	
electrification.			
7	
	
The	paper	is	organised	as	follows:	section	2	presents	the	regulatory	environment	for	mini-grids	in	India.	
Section	3	presents	the	methodology,	assumptions	and	model	inputs	while	section	4	discusses	results.	The	
policy	recommendations	and	conclusions	are	presented	in	the	last	section.	
	
2.0	Regulatory	environment	for	mini-grids	in	India	
 
The	Electricity	Act	(EA)	2003	governs	the	electricity	industry	in	India	and	requires	that	electricity	access	is	
provided	to	all	areas	using	a	two-pronged	approach:	(1)	extension	of	grid-connected	supply	and	(2)	use	of	
stand-alone	systems	including	those	based	on	renewable	sources	of	energy.	The	Act	permitted	stand-alone	
systems	(including	those	based	on	renewable	sources	of	energy)	as	a	rural	electrification	option	and	
exempts	generation	and	distribution	of	electricity	in	a	rural	area	from	obtaining	any	license	from	the	
regulator.	However,	Palit	and	Bandyopadhyay	(2015)	observe	that	the	exemptions	provided	under	section	
13	and	section	14	of	the	Act	remain	ambiguous,	causing	regulatory	uncertainty.	
The	National	Electricity	Policy	(NEP)	and	the	Rural	Electrification	Policy	(REP)	support	the	option	of	
decentralised	distributed	generation	with	local	distribution	networks	when	grid	extension	is	not	feasible.	
The	Rural	Electrification	Policy	(REP)	allows	the	possibility	of	setting	the	tariff	through	mutual	agreement	
between	the	supplier	and	the	consumers.	The	new	Tariff	Policy,	notified	in	January	2016,	has	also	offered	
the	purchase	of	power	by	the	grid	as	and	when	the	grid	reaches	the	village.	
In	addition	to	the	federal	government	initiatives,	several	state	governments	have	undertaken	initiatives	to	
promote	decentralised	renewable	systems.	Specific	reference	is	made	to	Uttar	Pradesh,	which	has	
published	its	mini-grid	policy	in	February	20164	and	the	Uttar	Pradesh	Electricity	Regulatory	Commission	
has	issued	the	Mini-Grid	Renewable	Energy	Generation	and	Supply	Regulations,	2016	(MREG&S	
Regulations,	2016)5.	The	policy	and	the	regulations	allow	for	state	government	subsidy	to	support	mini-grid	
development,	provide	exit	options	to	mitigate	the	risks	of	grid	extension,	and	specify	tariff	and	supply	
																																								 																				
4 http://upneda.org.in/sites/default/files/all/section/Mini%20Grid%20Policy%202016.pdf  
5 http://upneda.org.in/sites/default/files/all/section/MiniGrid%20regulations%202016.pdf  
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quality	requirements.	The	details	are	provided	in	Annex	1.	While	the	policy	offers	two	implementation	
pathways	–	with	state	subsidy	and	without	state	subsidy,	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	developer	can	avail	
additional	support	from	the	Ministry	of	New	and	Renewable	Energy	(MNRE).	The	analytical	contours	of	our	
study	are	partly	defined	by	the	Uttar	Pradesh	mini-grid	policy.	In	addition	to	UP,	some	other	states	(such	as	
Bihar,	Odisha6,	Madhya	Pradesh,	Jharkhand)	have	also	produced	guidelines/	frameworks	or	policies	on	
mini-grids.	Moreover,	more	than	15	states	have	declared	state	specific	solar	policies	with	provisions	related	
to	promotion	of	mini-grids.	The	governance	environment	is	likely	to	become	clearer	once	the	policies	and	
regulatory	co-ordinations	improve	and	the	federal	government	comes	out	with	the	mini-grid	policy.			
	
3.0	Methodology,	model	inputs	and	assumptions	
3.1	Methodology	
The	study	uses	a	discounted	cash-flow	analysis	of	mini-grid	projects	of	two	specific	sizes,	namely	a	25	kWp	
mini-grid	project	in	Uttar	Pradesh	considering	the	prevalent	mini-grid	size	of	20-30	kW	in	India	where	we	
apply	the	terms	prescribed	by	the	UP	Mini-Grid	Policy	and	a	large	2	MWp	grid-connected	renewable	energy	
distributed	generation	and	supply	project	in	a	village	location	that	serves	as	a	mini-grid	and	sells	excess	
power	to	the	grid	to	find	out	whether	they	are	financially	viable	and	attractive	investment	propositions.	
The	analysis	is	done	for	a	village	location	in	Sitapur	District	of	Uttar	Pradesh,	having	latitude	27.55N	and	
longitude	80.65E.		
We	have	considered	solar	PV-based	mini-grids	as	they	are	prevalent	in	India.	This	was	also	done	to	limit	the	
scope	of	analysis	for	this	study.	Given	the	policy	thrust	on	solar	PV	in	India,	it	is	also	meaningful	to	lay	
emphasis	on	solar	energy-based	mini-grids.	However,	a	similar	analysis	can	be	performed	as	an	extension	
work	considering	other	technologies	or	even	considering	hybrid-technologies.	The	solar	radiation	for	the	
																																								 																				
6	Odisha	has	come	up	with	a	policy	in	November	2016	known	as	‘Odisha	Renewable	Energy	Policy	2016’.	This	policy	
has	a	specific	section	on	RE	based	mini/micro	grid	(Section	8.1.1	of	the	policy).	
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location	was	obtained	from	PV-Watts	Calculator	and	the	model	is	calibrated	to	match	the	annual	electricity	
output	of	a	solar	PV	system	in	the	above	location.	
The	financial	viability	has	been	analysed	using	a	financial	simulation	approach.	This	is	explained	in	Figure	1.	
The	financial	simulations	focused	on	viability	gap	of	a	project	based	on	its	discounted	cash	inflow	and	
outflows	over	the	project	lifetime.	Cash	inflows	were	determined	through	the	consumer	mix,	tariff	
parameters	and	saleable	electricity	produced	by	the	plant.	The	saleable	electricity	is	the	gross	electricity	
production	less	distribution	losses	as	found	in	typical	mini-grid	projects	in	India.	The	cash	outflow	is	based	
on	interest	on	debt,	return	on	equity,	depreciation	charges,	operation	and	maintenance	costs,	insurance	
charges	and	battery	replacement	expenses	as	appropriate.		The	financial	parameters,	consumer	mix,	and	
tariff	parameters	are	varied	in	different	simulations	to	investigate	their	effects	on	the	viability	of	the	
project.	The	viability	gap	is	bridged	either	with	a	fixed	viability	support	or	a	variable	support	instrument	and	
the	support	required	is	obtained	iteratively	to	arrive	at	a	zero-viability	gap.		
The	levelised	cost	of	electricity	supply	(LCOE)	is	used	as	the	break-even	cost	of	electricity	supply.	This	is	the	
minimum	price	that	the	plant	has	to	get	in	order	to	break-even	over	the	lifetime	of	the	plant.	The	LCOE	is	
calculated	as	the	ratio	of	lifetime	cost	and	lifetime	electricity	generation	(Reichelstein	and	Yorston,	2013).	
At	this	price,	the	supplier	will	be	able	to	take	care	of	borrowing	costs	and	pay	a	reasonable	return	of	equity	
and	ensure	return	of	the	capital.	All	calculations	have	been	carried	out	in	an	Excel	worksheet.	
<<Figure	1	here>>	
		
3.2	Model	inputs	and	assumptions	
	
To	operationalise	the	above	model,	various	inputs	have	been	used.	The	capital	cost	for	mini-grids	is	based	
on	the	benchmark	costs	prescribed	by	the	Ministry	of	New	and	Renewable	Energy	(MNRE),	India	for	solar	
PV-based	mini-grid	systems.	Similarly,	the	costs	for	MW-scale	projects	are	taken	from	the	benchmarks	
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prescribed	by	the	Central	Electricity	Regulatory	Commission	(CERC).	For	mini-grids7,	Rs.	300/Wp	(4.62	
USD/Wp)	is	used	whereas	for	the	MW-scale	project8,	a	cost	of	Rs	53/Wp	(0.82	USD/Wp)	is	used9.	The	costs	
include	plant	and	equipment	costs,	distribution	network	(for	mini-grid	only),	metering,	land	acquisition	and	
civil	construction	costs.	Additional	assumptions	are	made	for	the	following:	the	O&M	cost	is	taken	as	3%	of	
the	capital	cost.	The	O&M	cost	is	assumed	to	increase	5%	per	year.	2%	of	the	capital	cost	is	taken	as	the	
cost	of	insurance	for	the	plant	per	year	for	the	mini-grid	and	1%	for	the	large	solar	plant.	The	output	is	
assumed	to	de-rate	1%	per	year	and	the	life	is	taken	as	20	years	(Ernst	and	Young,	2016).	It	is	assumed	that	
the	technical	and	commercial	loss	in	the	system	is	15%10,	and	the	saleable	output	is	obtained	after	
deducting	the	energy	lost	in	the	system.	These	assumptions	are	based	on	our	experience	of	mini-grid	
projects	developed	in	India.	
In	line	with	the	MNRE	guidelines,	depreciation	is	allowed	to	the	extent	of	90%	of	the	capital	cost	of	the	
asset	and	a	stepped-linear	depreciation	scale	is	used	in	which	70%	of	the	depreciation	takes	place	in	the	
first	12	years	of	the	plant	life	and	the	remaining	is	depreciated	over	the	rest	of	the	plant	life.	Following	the	
guidance	given	in	accounting	standard	for	government	grants,	the	asset	value	net	of	capital	grant	is	has		
been	considered	for	depreciation11.	
For	discounting	purposes,	the	weighted	average	cost	of	capital	is	used.	The	weighted	average	cost	of	capital	
represents	the	rate	of	return	required	by	the	investors	and	hence	it	is	used	as	the	discount	factor.12	Any	
available	capital	grant	is	applied	first	and	the	capital	investment	requirement	is	reduced	by	the	grant	
amount.	The	balance	of	capital	is	funded	through	debt	and	equity	at	a	70:30	ratio	(as	in	TNERC,	2017).	The	
amount	of	grant	capital	is	varied	in	the	analysis	to	find	the	sensitivity	of	projects	to	capital	subsidy.	
																																								 																				
7 http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/CFA-offgrid-decentralised-solar-applications-programme-2014-
15.pdf.  
8	http://www.cercind.gov.in/2016/orders/SO17.pdf.	Similar cost data is also reported here:	
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/08/f25/LCOE.pdf.   
  
 9 One US dollar is equivalent to about 65 Indian rupees. 
10 Equivalent to average AT&C loss incurred by some of the better managed discoms in India and the target 
loss set by Ministry of Power for discoms in India.  
11 This follows the guidance given in accounting standard AS12 in India 
(http://www.mca.gov.in/Ministry/notification/pdf/AS_12.pdf, last accessed on 30th June, 2018). 
12 Frankfurt School – UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance (2015) also uses the same.  
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Different	debt	tenures	are	considered	and	an	interest	rate	of	12%	per	year	(Chawla,	2016)	and	a	return	on	
equity	of	20%	per	year	are	used	in	the	analysis	(TNERC,	2017).		
For	the	mini-grid	project,	we	consider	three	scenarios	–	a	residential	customer	only	business	model,	a	
dominant	commercial	load	model	and	an	anchor	load	model	to	identify	how	the	viability	changes.	The	
consumer	mix	in	the	base	case	is	taken	as	100%	residential.	The	effects	of	a	10%	residential	load	and	an	
anchor	load	are	also	analysed.	The	tariff	parity	with	the	grid	system	is	assumed	for	the	consumers.	
Specifically,	the	residential	consumers	are	assumed	to	pay	a	tariff	of	Rs	5/kWh	(0.077	USD/kWh)	and	the	
commercial	consumers	pay	a	tariff	of	Rs	12/kWh	(0.18	USD/kWh).	The	residential	tariff	corresponds	to	the	
UP	Mini-grid	Policy	stipulation	for	up	to	100	W	load	for	8	hours.		
Where	the	project	does	not	break-even	without	support,	a	viability	gap	funding	is	used	to	reach	the	break-
even	point	through	an	iterative	process.		
Different	scenarios	are	considered	in	the	analysis.	The	financial	performance	of	projects	under	different	
levels	of	grant	funding,	debt	tenure,	debt	cost,	consumer	mix,	and	alternative	tariff	cases	is	analysed.	We	
also	verify	the	sensitivity	of	outcomes	with	respect	to	technical	and	non-technical	losses.	
4.0	Results	and	discussions	
The	results	for	the	mini-grid	project	are	reported	first,	which	is	organised	in	three	sub-sections	for	three	
cases	being	analysed.	The	findings	for	the	large	project	are	then	presented.	
4.1	Analysis	of	a	typical	25	kW	mini-grid	system	
Given	that	the	consumer	mix	affects	the	project	viability,	we	have	considered	a	residential	only	supply,	a	
predominantly	commercial	load	case	and	an	anchor	load	model.		
4.1.1 Financial viability analysis of a residential only supply  
This	case	considers	supply	to	residential	customers	who	pay	a	tariff	of	Rs	5/kWh	as	prescribed	in	the	UP	
Mini-grid	Policy.	The	financial	viability	of	the	project	is	analysed	considering	different	levels	of	capital	grant	
(0%	to	100%)	while	assuming	that	the	plant	incurs	the	benchmark	costs.	Figure	2	indicates	the	LCOE	of	the	
project	for	different	levels	of	grant.	At	no	capital	subsidy,	the	break-even	price	is	as	high	as	Rs	87.4/kWh	
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(1.34	USD/kWh)	and	at	100%	capital	subsidy,	the	LCOE	reduces	to	Rs	27.8/kWh	(0.43	USD/kWh).	This	
suggests	that	a	25	kWp	solar	plant	even	with	100%	capital	subsidy	is	not	a	cost-effective	proposition	if	it	
sells	electricity	at	Rs	5/kWh	to	residential	consumers.	Although	the	O&M	costs	are	low	for	a	solar	PV	plant,	
the	cost	of	battery	replacement	at	a	regular	interval	has	to	be	taken	care	of	through	the	tariff,	which	makes	
the	electricity	supply	cost	high	even	when	the	system	gets	100%	capital	subsidy.		
<<Figure 2 here>> 
 
If	the	service	charges	Rs	5/	kWh	to	residential	consumers,	the	total	subsidy	requirement	for	the	25	kWp	
system	amounts	to	Rs.	17.18	million	(0.26M	USD)	with	no	capital	subsidy	and	Rs	12.11	million	(0.19M	USD)	
with	100%	subsidy.	The	viability	gap	reduces	linearly	as	the	capital	subsidy	rate	increases	from	zero	per	
cent	to	hundred	per	cent.	Thus,	the	viability	of	a	residential	load	only	mini-grid	business	following	the	UP	
Mini-grid	policy	remains	questionable.	At	30%	capital	grant,	an	estimated	net	present	loss	of	Rs	15.66	
million	(0.24M	USD)	emerges,	which	does	not	make	the	project	attractive	to	any	private	investor.	To	bring	
down	the	break-even	tariff,	the	natural	tendency	for	the	investor	is	to	compromise	on	quality	to	economise	
on	capital	costs.	We	find	that	if	the	capital	investment	is	reduced	by	50%,	through	such	compromises,	the	
break-even	tariff	comes	to	about	Rs.	30/kWh	(0.46	USD/kWh)	with	a	30%	capital	subsidy	for	residential-
only	supplies.	This	is	the	model	being	used	in	India	by	some	private	suppliers	who	are	enlisting	the	required	
number	of	customers	that	a	plant	can	support	and	are	providing	supply	for	LED	lamp-based	lighting	at	a	flat	
monthly	rate	to	enhance	the	cost	recovery	of	the	plant.	However,	this	raises	an	important	equity	issue:	why	
should	the	off-grid	consumers	be	disadvantaged	because	of	their	remoteness	or	low	demand	and	why	
should	they	pay	a	high	kWh	rate	for	the	service?		Given	that	the	consumers	are	likely	to	be	poorer	as	well	
makes	such	a	tariff	regressive.	The	social	cost	of	no	electricity	access	is	high	and	so	there	has	to	be	a	
mechanism	by	which	mini-grids	can	be	supported	so	that	there	is	tariff	parity,	though	their	actual	cost	of	
supply	in	remote	areas	may	be	high.		
Instead	of	a	high	fixed	tariff	to	the	consumers,	an	alternative	option	would	be	to	enforce	price	parity	at	the	
consumer	end	but	to	allow	the	supplier	to	receive	an	output-based	incentive	in	the	form	of	a	viability	gap	
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funding	(VGF)	from	a	universal	service	obligation	fund.	Figure	1	indicates	the	declining	rate	of	a	variable	
VGF	as	the	capital	subsidy	rate	increases.	For	a	30%	capital	grant	or	subsidy,	the	plant	requires	about	Rs	
64/kWh	(~1	USD/kWh)	as	the	variable	VGF	while	for	a	100%	capital	subsidy,	the	variable	VGF	reduces	to	Rs	
22/kWh	(0.34	USD/kWh)	for	a	full	recovery	of	the	benchmark	costs.			
Even	when	the	government	provides	capital	subsidy,	this	is	available	on	successful	completion	of	the	
project.	The	investor	thus	is	required	to	mobilise	the	initial	capital	and	can	claim	the	capital	subsidy	in	due	
course.	The	delay	in	recovering	the	subsidy	has	financial	implications	for	the	investor.	In	addition,	if	a	
variable	VGF	is	used,	the	delay	in	payment	of	such	funding	will	increase	the	borrowing	for	the	working	
capital,	which	can	be	a	legitimate	business	expense	for	the	supplier.				
The	subsidy	burden	for	the	government	and	the	utility	is	an	important	issue	to	consider.	Figure	2	shows	
that	the	subsidy	burden	reduces	with	higher	grant	proportion.	This	is	due	to	the	reduction	in	the	carrying	
cost	of	capital	but	clearly	the	subsidy	reduction	is	less	steep	compared	to	LCOE	or	VGF.		
As	the	interest	on	loan	has	a	clear	influence	on	the	levelised	cost	of	electricity	supply,	the	interest	rate	was	
varied	in	steps	of	5%	from	0%	to	15%	per	year.	Figure	3	indicates	the	change	in	LCOE	as	the	interest	rate	is	
varied	for	different	levels	of	capital	subsidy.	If	the	loan	becomes	interest	free,	the	cost	of	supply	reduces	to	
Rs	60.2	per	kWh	(USD	0.93/kWh)	for	no	capital	subsidy	and	Rs	32.6/	kWh	(USD	0.5/kWh)	for	100%	capital	
subsidy.	A	similar	trend	is	visible	for	other	interest	rates.	At	around	80%	capital	subsidy,	the	LCOE	becomes	
very	similar	for	all	interest	rates,	which	acts	as	a	tipping	point.	This	happens	because	of	the	influence	of	the	
discount	rate	–	at	lower	interest,	the	discount	rate	becomes	smaller,	which	reduces	the	time	value	
influence	on	the	net	present	value.	
<<Figure	3	here>>	
	
Similarly,	the	tenure	of	debt	has	an	impact	on	the	LCOE	and	the	cash	flow.	The	sensitivity	of	LCOE,	variable	
VGF	and	total	subsidy	amount	due	to	changes	in	the	debt	tenure	is	captured	in	Fig.	4.	With	shorter	debt	
tenure,	the	break-even	cost	of	supply,	the	variable	VGF	amount	and	the	subsidy	requirement	reduces.	With	
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a	10-year	tenure,	the	LOCE	reduces	to	Rs	77.7/kWh	(USD	1.19/kWh)	for	the	base	case	(all	other	variables	
remaining	unchanged).	However,	a	shorter	tenure	of	loan	makes	repayment	difficult	due	to	inadequate	
internal	resource	mobilisation	for	loan	repayment.	Accelerated	depreciation	will	be	required	which	will	
affect	the	results.	
<<Figure	4	here>>	
	
The	technical	and	non-technical	loss	is	another	variable	that	has	a	significant	influence	on	the	results.	The	
analysis	above	is	based	on	the	average	loss	of	15%.	However,	given	the	small	size	of	their	operation	and	the	
possibility	of	using	advanced	metering	and	monitoring	systems,	the	losses	can	be	reduced.	The	best	
operating	systems	tend	to	have	a	loss	of	10%.	The	sensitivity	of	LCOE	to	any	change	in	technical	and	non-
technical	loss	is	shown	in	Figure	5.	Three	loss	levels	are	presented	–	15%,	10%	and	an	aspirational	level	of	
5%.	As	expected,	with	a	reduction	in	the	loss,	LCOE	reduces,	which	in	turn	reduces	the	viability	gap	per	unit	
of	electricity	sold.	The	gap	between	power	generation	and	power	sold	reduces	and	this	allows	the	expenses	
to	be	spread	over	a	larger	base,	thereby	reducing	the	LCOE	and	support	requirement	per	unit	of	electricity	
sold.	But	because	the	consumers	are	assumed	to	pay	a	nominal	tariff	of	Rs	5/kWh	in	this	case,	the	total	
subsidy	requirement	does	not	change	appreciably.	
<<Figure	5	here>>	
The	above	analysis	offers	the	following	lessons:	
a) A	solar	PV	generated	mini-grid	based	supply	still	remains	a	costly	option,	requiring	a	relatively	high	
break-even	price,	which	is	practically	impossible	to	recover	through	customer	tariffs	alone.	Even	
with	a	100%	capital	subsidy,	price	parity	with	the	regulated	grid	supply	cannot	be	achieved	as	the	
project	will	not	be	financially	viable	for	the	project	developer.	
b) Price	parity	with	the	grid	supply	can	only	be	achieved	through	a	combination	of	capital	grant	and	
VGF.	Higher	the	capital	grant	allowed,	lower	is	the	variable	VGF	required.	
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c) Alternatively,	the	financial	viability	can	be	ensured	through	capital	grant	and	a	flat	rate	tariff,	which	
has	to	be	comparatively	high	to	ensure	adequate	revenue	recovery.	
d) A	high	initial	capital	grant	reduces	the	overall	subsidy	burden	for	the	government	and	can	be	an	
appropriate	financing	mechanism	to	enhance	access	to	energy.	
e) The	results	are	sensitive	to	interest	rate	and	debt	tenure	and	a	lower	interest	rate	or	debt	tenure	
can	reduce	the	cost	of	supply	and	subsidy	requirement	but	the	loan	repayment	may	be	an	issue	in	a	
reduced	tenure	loan.	
f) As	cost	reduction	is	essential	to	ensure	project	viability,	there	may	be	a	natural	tendency	to	
compromise	on	technical	standards	for	delivery	infrastructure.		
g) Similarly,	any	reduction	in	technical	and	non-commercial	losses	also	reduces	the	LCOE	and	brings	
down	the	cost	of	supply.		
	
4.1.2 Financial viability for a predominantly commercial load model 
	
In	this	case,	it	is	assumed	that	the	load	mix	is	composed	of	90%	commercial	load	and	10%	residential	load,	
which	is	in	line	with	a	condition	allowed	by	the	Uttar	Pradesh	Mini-grid	Policy.	It	is	assumed	that	the	
commercial	consumers	pay	a	tariff	of	Rs	12/kWh	whereas	the	residential	consumers	pay	a	tariff	of	Rs	
5/kWh.	The	full	benchmark	cost	prescribed	by	MNRE	is	used	along	with	other	assumptions	as	indicated	in	
the	case	of	residential	only	case.	The	results	are	presented	in	Figure	6.		
<<Figure	6	here>>	
	
The	LCOE	remains	the	same	as	before	but	the	viability	gap	reduces	due	to	higher	commercial	tariff.	The	
variable	VGF	required	is	slightly	lower	than	the	residential	only	case	but	as	before	the	service	remains	
financially	unviable	with	tariff	revenue	and	additional	support	either	through	viable	gap	funding	or	capital	
subsidy	or	a	combination	thereof	is	required.		
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If	there	is	no	capital	subsidy,	either	the	project	developer	would	need	a	variable	viability	gap	support	of	Rs	
75/kWh	(USD	1.15/kWh)	or	the	commercial	consumer	tariff	would	have	to	be	increased	to	Rs	82/kWh	(USD	
1.26/kWh)	to	ensure	full	cost	recovery.	Clearly,	this	results	in	a	very	high	tariff	that	is	unaffordable	by	many	
commercial	consumers	and	would	make	the	project	unviable.	If	the	project	cost	is	reduced	by	50%	through	
cost	saving	measures	and	prevalent	MNRE	subsidy,	the	commercial	tariff	can	also	be	reduced	by	50%	(Rs	
41/kWh	or	0.63	USD/kWh)	to	break-even.	While	commercial	consumers	may	afford	to	pay	such	a	tariff,	it	is	
much	higher	than	grid	parity	tariff	and	puts	additional	financial	burden	on	the	rural	consumers.	
				
4.1.3 Financial viability of an anchor load model  
In	the	anchor	load	model,	it	is	assumed	that	80%	of	the	demand	comes	from	the	anchor	load	while	the	rest	
is	residential.	Residential	consumers	pay	Rs	5/kWh	while	the	anchor	load	tariff	is	used	as	a	balancing	figure.	
Other	assumptions	remain	same	as	before.	The	LCOE	does	not	change	as	the	cost	side	of	the	equation	is	
not	affected.		
Figure	7	presents	the	main	results.	If	the	anchor	load	pays	the	grid	parity	tariff	applicable	to	a	commercial	
consumer,	the	mini-grid	investment	does	not	become	a	viable	proposition	without	any	subsidy.	As	the	
figure	indicates,	with	no	capital	subsidy,	the	business	makes	a	staggering	financial	loss	of	Rs	15.69	million	
(or	$0.24	million).	The	financial	loss	reduces	to	Rs	3.2	million	($0.049	million)	with	a	100%	capital	grant	but	
still	the	project	is	not	viable.	If	the	anchor	load	pays	a	balancing	tariff	to	break-even	the	costs,	the	tariff	
becomes	Rs	92/kWh	(USD	1.41/kWh).	This	is	much	higher	than	they	pay	for	diesel-based	supplies	and	it	
remains	doubtful	whether	large	commercial	consumers	such	as	telecom	towers	will	be	willing	to	accept	
such	a	high	tariff.	The	balancing	tariff	becomes	Rs	29/kWh	(USD	0.45/kWh)	at	100%	capital	subsidy.	While	
this	tariff	can	be	acceptable	to	the	users,	100%	grant-funded	projects	remains	an	unlikely	commercial	
proposition.		
	
<<Figure	7	here>>	
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If	tariff	parity	is	the	objective,	then	some	viability	gap	funding	will	be	required	to	ensure	financial	
attractiveness	of	the	mini-grid	investment.	A	variable	VGF	is	considered	in	the	above	figure	to	supplement	
the	capital	grant.	It	shows	that	a	payment	of	Rs	75/kWh	(USD	1.15/kWh)	will	be	required	to	balance	the	
books	when	there	is	no	capital	subsidy	whereas	a	funding	of	Rs	16/kWh	(USD	0.25/kWh)	will	be	required	
when	100%	capital	grant	is	available.	The	subsidy	burden	on	the	government	ranges	between	Rs	15.71	
million	(USD	0.24	million)	for	no	capital	grant	case	and	Rs.	10.85	million	(USD	0.17	million)	for	the	100%	
capital	grant	case.		
From	a	project	developer’s	perspective,	when	the	project	viability	has	to	be	ensured	with	a	capital	grant	of	
30%,	the	negotiated	tariff	route	becomes	a	more	preferable	option.	Mini-grid	developers	in	India	are	often	
using	a	flat	rate	tariff	of	Rs	150-200	per	month	for	a	basic	level	of	supply	to	residential	consumers.	This	is	
considered	to	be	the	amount	residential	consumers	pay	to	buy	kerosene	and	hence	are	willing	to	pay	that	
much	for	a	better	quality	of	light.	Assuming	that	the	residential	consumers	pay	a	flat	tariff	of	Rs	150/month	
for	a	basic	level	of	consumption	of	5kWh/month,	their	effective	tariff	comes	to	Rs.	30/kWh.	In	such	a	case,	
the	balancing	tariff	for	an	anchor	load	would	be	Rs	67	(USD	1.03/kWh)	for	a	30%	capital	subsidy13.	As	the	
project	developer	is	likely	to	require	a	smaller	distribution	network	and	given	that	non-technical	losses	are	
likely	to	be	less	due	to	limited	number	of	residential	consumers,	it	is	possible	to	benefit	from	some	
economy	in	capital	costs	and	better	revenue	generation.	Considering	these	possibilities	(i.e.	capital	cost	
reduces	to	Rs	200/Wp	and	the	distribution	losses	reduce	to	10%),	the	balancing	anchor	load	tariff	becomes	
Rs	39/kWh	(USD	0.6/kWh)	for	a	30%	capital	subsidy,	which	appears	to	be	in	the	acceptable	range.			
To	summarise,	the	anchor	load	model:	
1) Would	find	it	difficult	to	recover	full	costs	without	a	certain	amount	of	capital	subsidy	or	
viability	gap	funding.	Enforcing	grid-parity	tariff	makes	the	projects	more	dependent	on	
support	systems	and	hence	more	vulnerable.	
																																								 																				
13 The effective come will be Rs 50.kWh/month if the basic consumption is 3kWh/month, which can be from a 
15W of load served for 6 hours a day for 30 days per month. The balancing tariff looks viable in such a case. 
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2) Would	benefit	from	the	possibility	of	a	negotiated	tariff.	With	a	capital	grant	of	30%,	a	viable	
business	can	be	developed	with	a	reasonable	negotiated	tariff,	as	long	as	the	project	does	not	
require	an	extensive	distribution	network	and	manages	technical	and	commercial	losses	well.		
4.2	Analysis	of	a	larger-scale	project	(2	MW)	
It	is	assumed	that	a	grid-tied	2	MWp	solar	PV	plant	is	being	installed	in	a	rural	location	of	which	25	kWp	is	
being	considered	as	part	of	the	distributed	generation	scheme	and	the	rest	is	eligible	for	the	feed-in	tariff	
applicable	for	a	large	solar	PV	plant.14	Being	a	large-scale	project,	it	attracts	economies	of	scale	that	
reduces	the	capital	investment	need	per	kW	of	capacity.	The	benchmark	capital	cost	for	this	plant	is	
considered	as	Rs	53/Wp.	The	larger	plant	being	grid-tied,	it	does	not	require	any	battery	bank	and	there	is	
no	battery	replacement	cost	in	this	case.	The	energy	generated	is	directly	transferred	to	the	grid,	thereby	
avoiding	the	battery-related	costs.	However,	for	the	smaller	25	kWp	plant	considered	for	local	mini-grid,	
the	battery	bank	will	be	required	and	the	replacement	cost	is	accounted	for	in	the	analysis.	
The	plant	is	assumed	to	have	a	life	of	20	years	(Ernst	and	Young,	2016).	The	grant	capital	share		is	kept	as	
variable	while	30%	of	the	balance	is	taken	as	equity	and	70%	is	assumed	to	come	from	debt.	The	debt	
tenure	is	taken	as	10	years	at	an	interest	of	12%	per	year	(Chawla,	2016)	while	the	return	on	equity	is	taken	
as	20%.The	weighted	average	cost	of	capital	is	taken	as	the	rate	of	depreciation.	These	assumptions	reflect	
closely	the	prevailing	conditions	in	Indian	projects.	
As	before,	we	consider	a	number	of	cases	to	find	out	the	support	requirement	to	ensure	financial	viability	
of	such	a	project.	We	consider	that	the	large	project	receives	a	feed-in	tariff,	and	the	DDG	component	
charges	Rs	5/kWh	to	residential	consumers	and	Rs	12/kWh	to	commercial	consumers	and	has	a	mix	of	
80:20	for	residential	and	commercial	consumers.	For	a	given	feed-in	tariff	and	retail	tariff,	the	financial	
balancing	is	achieved	varying	the	capital	grant	amount.	
																																								 																				
14 The size of the generation plant depends on the ability of the network to evacuate it and availability of land 
to house PV panels. These are assumed to be available in the given location. India has installed a large 
number of MW-scale PV projects under national and state schemes. The size ranges between 1 to 25MW 
(http://www.pv-insider.com/development-india/documents/PV-Utility-Scale-Map-India-Final.pdf), including 
many between 1 and 2 MW.   
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Figure	8	provides	the	levelised	cost	of	electricity	for	this	system.	The	levelised	cost	at	full	benchmark	cost	
(i.e.	no	capital	grant)	comes	to	Rs.	8.56/kWh	(USD	0.13/kWh).	This	is	a	very	reasonable	electricity	
generation	cost	from	a	renewable	energy	source	and	is	an	attractive	investment	proposition.	The	break-
even	cost	declines	rapidly	with	the	proportion	of	capital	grant.	At	100%	capital	grant,	the	levelised	cost	
becomes	5	paise/kWh.	With	a	capital	subsidy	of	50%,	the	break-even	price	reaches	Rs.	6.85/kWh.	Clearly,	
the	viability	of	a	larger	plant	can	be	easily	appreciated.	The	levelised	capital	subsidy	per	unit	of	electricity	
varies	from	Rs.	72/kWh	(USD	1.1/kWh)	for	100%	subsidy	to	no	subsidy	for	the	unsubsidised	case.				
<<Figure	8	here>>	
	
Lower	capital	cost	arising	from	the	scale	economies	along	with	shorter	debt	tenure	considered	here	has	
reduced	the	unit	subsidy	cost.	The	small	DDG	plant	which	is	appended	to	the	larger	plant	is	effectively	
subsidised	by	the	larger	plant	to	recover	its	costs.	Given	its	expenses	and	income	are	insignificant	
compared	to	the	larger	plant,	it	is	not	elaborated	further	here.		
As	states	are	moving	towards	a	feed-in	tariff-based	system	for	grid-connected	renewable	electricity,	it	is	
interesting	to	find	out	how	much	capital	grant	is	required	to	ensure	viability	of	such	large	projects.	Uttar	
Pradesh	Regulations	provide	for	feed-in	tariff	as	applicable	to	rooftop	systems	(which	is	Rs	7.06/kWh	set	in	
2014-15)	levelised	for	25	years	for	plants	less	than	5	MW.	At	this	tariff,	about	18%	capital	subsidy	is	
required	to	break-even	(see	Figure	9).	If	the	government	allows	a	capital	subsidy	of	30%	capital	subsidy,	a	
tariff	of	Rs	5/kWh	(USD	0.077/kWh)	is	sufficient	to	break-even.			
	
<<Figure	9	here>>	
From	the	analysis	of	this	larger	plant,	the	following	lessons	can	be	learnt:	
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1) Larger	power	plants	offer	benefits	in	terms	of	lower	cost	of	electricity	supply	and	can	help	maintain	
a	reasonable	cost	of	electricity	supply.	The	subsidy	or	capital	support	required	for	such	a	plant	is	
lower	on	a	unit	cost	basis	and	thus	offers	a	better	value	for	money.	
2) Appropriate	feed-in	tariff	is	essential	for	the	financial	viability	of	a	larger	project.	As	noted	above,	a	
low	tariff	of	Rs	7/kWh	will	not	ensure	financial	viability	of	a	large	project	unless	capital	grant	is	
made	available.	The	commitment	to	the	tariff	for	the	project	duration	is	also	essential	to	ensure	
investor	confidence	in	these	projects.		
3) While	off-grid	locations	may	not	directly	benefit	from	such	large-scale	projects,	it	is	possible	to	
bundle	projects	under	an	umbrella	programme	to	reap	the	benefits	of	lower	cost	of	supply	and	
more	effective	use	of	taxpayer	money.	Aggregated	programme	level	operations	are	thus	a	better	
option	than	operating	in	a	pilot	scale	project	mode.	
4) However,	one	challenge	of	such	project	is	that	when	the	PDN	is	not	charged	during	blackouts,	the	
plant	will	not	be	able	to	feed	energy	to	the	grid.	If	load	shedding	is	high	during	day	time,	it	will	
create	problem	with	financials.		
	
5.0	Policy	recommendations	
India	has	made	significant	progress	in	terms	of	village	electrification	with	99.8%	of	the	villages	having	
access	to	grid	electricity.	However,	about	51	million	households	are	still	without	access	to	electricity,	many	
of	whom	live	in	so-called	electrified	villages	while	others	live	in	non-electrified	areas.	There	is	also	a	serious	
problem	with	the	quality	of	supply	as	many	electrified	areas	remain	underserved	and	receive	poor	quality	
supply.	Accordingly,	the	potential	for	mini-grids	arises	from	two	types	of	areas:	non-electrified	villages	and	
villages	(or	even	peri-urban	areas)	where	electricity	grid	exists	but	the	service	is	poor	or	inadequate.		
While	India	has	experimented	with	different	types	of	mini-grid	technologies,	the	solar	PV-based	mini-grids	
have	emerged	as	the	dominant	player.	Despite	having	experience	in	various	scales	(from	a	few	kW	or	MW	
scale),	the	financial	analysis	presented	in	section	4	shows	that	small-scale	projects	lead	to	relatively	high	
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cost	of	electricity	and	affordable	electricity	supply	requires	strong	financial	support	in	the	form	of	capital	
subsidy	and	often	revenue	subsidy.	This	at	least	can	be	considered	for	the	part	of	the	market	where	
electricity	should	be	considered	as	a	merit	good	rather	than	a	fully	marketed	service	(Mishra	et	al.,	2016).		
The	anchor	load	model	improves	the	revenue	generation	of	the	business	but	viability	gap	funding	is	
essential	to	ensure	financial	viability.	While	some	practitioners	argue	that	mini-grids	can	thrive,	without	any	
intervention	by	the	regulators,	based	on	mutually	agreed	tariff	with	consumers,	the	fact	is	that	mutually	
agreed	tariff	has	been	there	as	per	the	provision	of	the	EA	2003.	However,	private	sector	mini-grids	have	
not	as	yet	scaled	up	in	India	based	on	such	tariff	practices.	Thus,	better	incentives	to	operate	the	systems	
efficiently	and	over	the	lifetime	of	the	assets	are	required	to	ensure	long-term	sustainability	of	the	service.	
At	the	same	time,	more	effort	in	monitoring	and	evaluating	performance	of	mini-grids	in	the	country	is	also	
required	so	as	to	ensure	that	the	incentives	or	subsidies	provided	by	government	or	through	any	other	
means	can	be	tracked	to	ensure	better	outcomes.	Our	analysis	also	highlights	the	importance	of	low	cost	
financing.	Given	the	high	reliance	on	debt	funds,	low	interest	rates	will	reduce	the	interest	burden	and	
longer	tenure	allows	them	to	spread	the	cost.	Accordingly,	mini-grid	project	developers	need	access	to	
suitable	financial	instruments	to	manage	their	project	costs.		
However,	the	direct	financial	support	gets	offset	in	a	number	of	ways	through	social	and	economic	impacts	
produced	by	investments.	For	example,	the	mini-grid	in	an	off-grid	location	is	likely	to	displace	kerosene-
based	lighting,	which	brings	a	number	of	economic	and	social	benefits.	Kerosene	is	heavily	subsidised	in	
India	and	the	government	incurs	a	bill	of	$4	billion	per	year	in	kerosene	subsidies.	Out	of	this	about	$2	
billion	is	attributed	to	kerosene	use	for	lighting	(TERI,	2014).	If	the	entire	fuel-based	subsidy	for	lighting	is	
displaced	by	renewable	electricity,	it	would	save	about	6.7	billion	litres	of	kerosene	per	year	that	would	
avoid	18	million	tons	of	CO2	per	year	(TERI,	2014).	Further,	replacement	of	kerosene	use	thus	contributes	
to	health	benefits	by	reducing	morbidity	and	mortality,	savings	in	terms	of	expenses	on	medical	care	and	
loss	of	potential	income	due	to	illness	or	disability	(Deora	and	Chandran-Wadia,	2013).	Further,	the	black	
carbon	produced	by	kerosene	is	a	more	serious	global	warming	agent	compared	to	CO2	and	displacing	
kerosene	use	provides	a	low-hanging	fruit	towards	reducing	global	warming	(Deora	and	Chandran-Wadia,	
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2013).	Mini-grids	also	bring	other	benefits.	For	example,	the	businesses	are	generally	small-scale	and	the	
mini-grid	development	can	lead	to	a	large	number	of	entrepreneurs	in	the	country.	In	addition,	they	
generate	employment	opportunities	in	rural	areas	and	thus	contribute	directly	to	human	development	and	
poverty	alleviation.	It	also	has	gender-related	benefits.	The	investment	required	for	solar	mini-grids	for	
even	50,000	villages	is	a	small	amount	compared	to	the	subsidies	handed	out	by	the	government	under	
various	schemes	(Deora	and	Chandran-Wadia,	2013).		
Large-scale	power	plants	benefit	from	economies	of	scale	and	can	achieve	utility-range	electricity	prices.	
The	support	requirement	reduces	drastically	in	such	cases	and	promoting	large-scale	grid-tied	mini-grids	or	
generating	technologies	can	be	a	cost-effective	outcome	to	reduce	fossil-fuel	dependence	and	improve	
wellbeing.		
Based	on	the	above	findings,	the	following	recommendations	are	made:	
§ Mini-grids	need	financial	support	to	ensure	project	viability.	Our	study	shows	alternative	support	
mechanisms	such	as	blended	financing	are	possible	–	capital	grants,	fixed	viability	gap	funds,	a	
variable	viability	gap	payment	or	a	combination	of	these.	A	higher	capital	subsidy	appears	to	be	a	
less	costly	option	for	the	government	but	from	a	pragmatic	perspective,	a	flexible	financing	
mechanism	combining	capital	grants	and	a	viability	support	arrangement	is	likely	to	be	more	
appropriate.		
§ As	commercial	loads	and	anchor	loads	improve	the	viability	of	mini-grid	projects,	integration	of	
commercial	load	and	support	for	their	promotion	is	a	logical	step	for	any	project.	However,	given	
that	such	developmental	activities	go	beyond	the	scope	of	a	power	project,	better	coordination	
with	rural	development	agencies	and	industry	departments	can	be	beneficial.	
§ In	view	of	rapid	grid	expansion	in	India,	the	cost	recovery	of	mini-grids	is	likely	to	an	issue,	given	
that	the	existing	feed-in	tariff	is	unlikely	to	recover	the	project	investments.	Grid-tied	power	
generation	projects	in	rural	areas	in	the	range	of	1-5	MW	which	can	also	work	as	a	mini-grid	as	well	
as	supply	power	to	the	grid	can	offer	a	better	investment	opportunity	as	their	cost	recovery	is	
feasible	under	the	prevailing	feed-in	tariff	regime	and	existing	mini-grid	policies	of	different	states.		
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Fig.	1:	Framework	for	financial	analysis	used	in	this	study	
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Figure 2 LCOE and variable Viability Gap Funding requirement of a 25 kW plant 
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Figure 3 Sensitivity of LCOE to changes in the interest rate    
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Figure 4 Sensitivity of base case results to debt tenure 
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Figure	5:	Sensitivity	of	LCOE	with	respect	to	distribution	losses	
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Figure	6:	LCOE	and	viability	gap	funding	requirement	for	a	predominantly	commercial	load	case	
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Figure 7 Financial analysis results for the anchor load case 
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Figure	8	Levelised	cost	and	unit	capital	subsidy	requirement	of	a	2MW	solar	PV	plant	
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Figure 9 Grant support required for various levels of FIT 
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Annex	1:		
	
Annex	1:		Main	features	of	UP	mini-grid	policy	and	regulations	
Salient	features	of	UP	mini-grid	policy	
Project	Capacity:	Mini-Grid	Projects	of	maximum	capacity	500	kW	shall	be	installed	to	electrify	the	households	of	
villages/	habitations/	hamlets	which	are	un-electrified	or	are	having	unavailability	of	power	in	peak	demand	hours.	
	
Implementation	plan:	With	State	Government	subsidy:		
1)	State	government	to	provide	30	%	subsidy.		
2)	Built	Own	Operate	and	Maintain	(BOOM)	basis	and	10	years	mandatory	operation	and	maintenance.		
3)	Mandatory	daily	at	least	8	hours	(3h	morning,	5hr	evening)	for	domestic	demand.		
4)	Daily	6	hours	of	supply	for	productive	and	commercial	needs.	
5)	Electricity	Tariff:	Developer	will	charge	Rs.	60/-	per	month	for	load	of	50	Watt,	Rs.	120/-	per	month	for	load	up	to	
100	Watt	for	8	hours	of	daily	electricity	supply	and	for	the	load	more	than	100	Watt	tariff	will	be	on	mutual	consent	
between	consumers	and	developer.	
	
Self-identified	Projects	by	the	Developers	without	State	Government	subsidy:	
1)	No	subsidy	by	state	government;		
2)	Developer	will	be	allowed	to	charge	tariff	from	consumers	on	mutual	consent	basis.	
3)	UPNEDA	will	act	as	the	Nodal	Agency	for	Single	window	clearance	for	all	Mini	Grid	Projects	which	include	the	task	
related	to	issuance	and	facilitation	of	desired	Government	orders,	necessary	sanctions/permissions,	clearances,	
approvals,	consent	etc.	in	a	time	bound	manner.		
	
The	villages	covered	under	the	installed	project	shall	be	considered	as	last	mile	stone	infrastructure	and	on	the	access	
of	conventional	grid	following	two	exit	procedures	will	be	followed:	
43	
	
1)	The	energy	generated	from	the	plant	will	be	received	in	the	grid	by	DISCOM	at	the	tariff	decided	by	UPERC/	tariff	
decided	on	mutual	consent.	Project	developer	will	be	given	priority	for	authorisation	as	a	franchisee	by	Discom	
2)	Based	on	the	cost	benefit	analysis	of	the	installed	project,	it	can	be	transferred	to	the	DISCOM	at	the	cost	
determined	on	mutual	consent	between	DISCOM	and	developer.		
	
Project	Completion	time	(6	months’	time	extension	may	be	granted	for	delay	due	to	actual/natural	reasons	at	various	
levels):	
1)	Solar	energy	-	within	6	months,		
2)	Biomass	/Biogas-	within	9	months,	
3)	Wind	energy	and	small	hydro	-	within	01	year	
	
Use	of	fossil	fuel	e.g.	coal,	gas,	lignite,	Kerosene,	wood	etc.	is	prohibited	in	solar	thermal	based	projects.	In	Biomass	
based	projects	use	of	fossil	fuel	will	be	permissible	as	per	the	standard	of	Govt.	of	India.	In	absence	of	requisite	solar	
energy,	the	Genset	can	be	used	to	charge	the	battery	bank	etc.	in	Solar	Photovoltaic	Plants.		
	
To	ensure	the	online	monitoring,	quarterly	functionality	report	should	be	submitted	by	projects,	which	are	greater	
than	50	kW	in	capacity	and	installed	with	Government	subsidy.	
	
Land	use,	environment	and	stamp	duty	related	incentives	will	be	provided	to	for	the	sanctioned	projects	under	Uttar	
Pradesh	State	Industrial	Policy,	2012	of	industries	based	on	solar	energy	or	renewable	energy.	
	
The	highlights	of	the	UP	mini-grid	regulations	are	presented	below:	
	
Applicability:	New	and	existing	Mini-Grid	projects	(up	to	500kWp);		
	
Models	for	Business	Operations:	
	
Model	A:	No	existence	of	Grid:	-	The	Mini-Grid	Operator	(MGO)	will	be	responsible	for	electricity	generation	and	
supply	following	the	BOOM	model.		The	MGO	can	apply	a	suitable	tariff	for	the	entire	quantum	of	electricity	supplied	
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in	accordance	with	the	Uttar	Pradesh	Mini	Grid	Policy,	2016.	The	operator	can	transfer	the	ownership	of	the	
distribution	network	to	the	distribution	utility	on	depreciated	value	of	assets,	provided	the	network	conforms	to	the	
standards	of	the	utility’s	system.		
	
The	operator	can	either	sell	100%	to	consumers	at	a	mutually	agreed	tariff	or	partly	to	consumers	at	a	mutually	
agreed	tariff	and	sell	excess/surplus	electricity	to	Discoms	at	Mini-Grid	feed-in	tariff	(FiT),	or	sell	100%	electricity	to	
Discoms	according	to	UPERC	RE	tariff	regulations.	
	
Model	B:	Grid	pre-exists:-	The	operator	has	to	sell	100%	to	consumers	at	mutually	agreed	tariff	or	tariff	for	the	Mini-
Grid	Projects	with	the	State	Government	subsidy,	in	accordance	with	Uttar	Pradesh	Mini	Grid	Policy,	2016,	for	a	
minimum	of	period	six	months.	After	that	MGO	may	opt	for	one	of	the	options	given	in	Model	A.	
	
Technical	Standards	for	Construction	of	project	distribution	network	(PDN):	MGO	shall	be	responsible	for	safe	
Operation	and	Maintenance	of	the	PDN;	as	per	the	Electricity	Act	and	rules	regulations	made	there	under.	Discom	will	
share	Technical	Standards	for	discoms’	system.	
	
Standard	of	Performance:		MGO	to	supply	electricity	to	all	willing	domestic	consumers	within	40	meters	of	PDN,	to	
deploy	minimum	10%	of	the	project	capacity	to	cater	to	domestic	consumers	in	the	areas	if	there	is	a	demand	and	to	
supply	electricity	continuously	or	intermittently	for	a	minimum	period	of	5	hours,	between	compulsory	supply	hours	
each	day	to	all	the	connected	consumers.	
	
Technical	Standards	for	interconnection	with	the	Grid:	-	The	inter-connection	of	the	mini-grid	with	the	discom’s		
system	shall	comply	with	the	CEA	(Technical	Standards	for	connectivity	of	the		Distributed	Generation	Resources)	
Regulations,	2013	and	amendments	thereof.	Further,	the	cost	for	inter-connection	network	from	the	mini-grid	to	
inter-connection	point	shall	be	borne	by	the	MGO.	The	Mini-Grid	Projects	with	installed	capacity	above	50kWp	shall	
ensure	that	the	Technical	Standards	for	construction	of	PDN	comply	with	Construction	manual	for	design	and	
construction	of	lines	issued	by	Rural	Electrification	and	Secondary	System	Planning	Organization	(RESSPO),	Uttar	
Pradesh	Power	Corporation	Limited	(UPPCL),	or	The	Central	Electricity	Authority	(CEA)	(Measures	relating	to	Safety	
and	Electric	Supply)	Regulations,	2010.		
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Metering	Arrangement:	The	MGO	has	to	comply	with	CEA	(installation	and	operation	of	meters),	Regulations	2006.	
Discom	will	install	meter	at	the	interconnection	point	at	its	own	cost.	MGO	will	install	Generation	meter	at	the	Mini-
Grid	project	to	record	the	generation	of	electricity	and	each	outgoing	feeder.	This	will	also	serve	the	purpose	of	
Renewable	Purchase	Obligation	(RPO)	fulfilment	for	obligated	entity(ies);	
	
Distribution	Franchisee	(DF)	Framework:	MGO	may	undertake	the	role	of	Distribution	Franchisee	provided	MGO	fulfils	
the	modalities	to	be	specified	in	the	implementation	Guidelines	for	the	appointment	of	the	DF	by	the	discom	
	
Payment	Security:	Distribution	Licensee	shall	prioritize	making	payments	to	MGO.	
	
Formation	of	Technical	Committee:	The	Commission	will	constitute	a	Technical	Committee	at	the	state	level.	
	
	
